

***Military Personnel
Human Resources
Strategic Plan***

Change 1



**Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
for
Personnel and Readiness**

AUGUST 2002

MILITARY PERSONNEL HUMAN RESOURCES STRATEGIC PLAN CHANGE 1

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Department of Defense Military Personnel Component of the Human Resource Strategic Plan



- Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, 2001

The military personnel component of the Department of Defense's human resource strategic plan establishes the military personnel legislative and policy priorities for the next several years. The plan details objectives, supporting actions and measures of effectiveness within defined lines of operation. It assigns tasks, establishes milestones, identifies resource requirements and facilitates synergy for a wide range of military personnel issues. This plan is a dynamic document intended to serve as a planning reference and management tool for Department of Defense military human resource managers. Through continuous assessment and refinement, the plan will provide the focal point for ongoing and future military personnel legislative and policy efforts.

1. Case for Change

Over the last several years there have been significant changes in our society and the world and these changes have had a significant impact on the Department of Defense. The Military Services must recruit, train and retain people with the broad skills and good judgment needed to address the dynamic challenges of the 21st century. This must be accomplished in a very competitive environment.

Changing Youth Population

Although the youth population in the United States is growing and is estimated to be 27% of the total population by 2010, the recruiting requirement for young people is growing even faster.

In addition to the youth population growth, the ethnic mix of this population is also changing. Hispanic youth became the predominant minority in 2000 and people of Hispanic heritage are expected to make up 25% of the U.S. population by 2025.

Today's youth are also more education oriented. The college enrollment rate for today's youth is at an all time high of 63%. However, the 4-year graduation rate is 42% and the 2-year graduation rate is 38%. These statistics demonstrate the need for military recruiters to penetrate the college market.

Although the percentage of youth in the population is rising, youth's propensity to enlist in the military fell 3% in the last 10 years (32% to 29%). This reduced propensity to serve is attributable to America's economic prosperity over the last decade and the declining unemployment rates for youth.

As we enter the new millennium, we are also finding that youth's work expectations are different than their parents. Today's youth expect flexibility in their work, portability of retirement benefits, and a balance between time at work and free time.

Nature of Warfare Changing

With the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States has experienced a fundamental change in the nature of warfare. Asymmetrical warfare has emerged as the means by which our adversaries will most likely threaten the United States and its allies.

In addition, the United States military has been forward deployed more often to more locations in the past decade, and therefore the time away from home has risen for many specialties. This increasing time away from home has the potential to impact retention negatively and will need to be managed carefully by the Department.

Changing Force Demographics

The demographics of the force are also changing. More than half the enlisted force has at least one year of college education; however, their compensation is more consistent with their peers in the private sector who have not completed any college courses. In the officer corps, 97% have bachelor's degrees and almost half (44%) have advanced degrees.

The military has also experienced a dramatic increase in the number of members that are married and have families. More than half the military population is married (54%), and 47% of the force has children. In addition, 70% of military spouses are employed, which is a 9% increase over just the past five years.

As with any demobilization, the draw down of the military over the past decade has resulted in some undersized accession cohorts, which are exacerbated by retention problems in certain skills.

2. Methodology for Strategy Development

An eight-step process (Figure A) was used in developing the military human resource strategic plan.

- We began the process with an assessment of the current human resource management system and a brief look at how it came into being. A summary of this work is included in Appendix A.
- At the same time we were researching the history of our current system, we began an effort to capture the guidance from the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. The results of this effort can be found in Appendix B.
- Using all of this information and many other sources of recent information on military human resource management, we developed a set of questions the strategy must address and also developed a mission statement to focus our future efforts. The full text of these documents can be found in Appendix C.
- Based on these background documents, we developed discrete Lines of Operation with supporting actions and measures of effectiveness.




Figure A

3. Mission

To provide Human Resource policies, programs, and legislation that ensure the right number of military personnel have the requisite skills, abilities, and motivation to effectively and efficiently execute assigned missions.

4. Lines of Operation

The Department will execute a series of near and mid-term actions over the execution, budget, and Program Objective Memorandum years to leverage its resources and energy in order to best achieve the military human resource actions outlined in this plan which are organized into five Lines of Operation as depicted in Figure B:




Figure B

The plan describes these actions through a summary planning and status matrix for each line of operation and an information and status chart for each action (matrices can be found in Appendix D). The matrix and status charts are working documents, continually revised as existing programs are updated or completed and new programs are initiated. The status of actions within the plan will be assessed periodically by senior department leadership to ensure successful execution and to make appropriate course corrections.

Actions within each of the lines of operation are focused on some aspect of the personnel life cycle and are ultimately aimed at ensuring the United States military has the kinds of people it needs to conduct its mission.

Line of Operation 1: Increase willingness of American public to recommend military service to our youth

The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness will sponsor a Department-wide advertising campaign to accomplish three main objectives:

- (1) Increase the willingness of peers, parents, other adult influencers, and opinion makers outside the Armed Forces to recommend military service to American youth;
- (2) Increase the willingness of members of the DoD workforce to recommend military service to youth; and
- (3) Increase employer awareness of the importance of supporting Reserve members.

Line of Operation 2: Recruit the right number and quality

Each year the Department of Defense hires more youth than any other single employer in the United States. The Department of Defense simply cannot meet mission requirements without recruiting the right number and quality of young people each and every year. Key actions to accomplish this objective include:

- (1) Achieving qualitative and quantitative goals for Active, Guard, and Reserve components for both enlisted and officer requirements;
- (2) Promoting effective and efficient selection and assignment testing procedures to maximize the potential of all enlisted Service members;
- (3) Aggressively pursuing a workforce with diverse race, ethnic, and socioeconomic backgrounds;
- (4) Establishing transparent migration opportunities between the active and reserve components; one of the specific initiatives will be to develop and test a lateral entry program based on civilian acquired skills.

Line of Operation 3: Develop, sustain and retain the force

It isn't enough to make recruiting quantitative and qualitative goals each year. The Military Services must turn those volunteers into soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines, and must ensure that the requisite number of these young people choose to stay in and participate in the career force. Key actions to accomplish this objective include:

- (1) Determining if current incentives motivate performance and retain or transition members at the right time;

- (2) Maintaining an environment conducive to retention;
- (3) Balancing PERSTEMPO and mission accomplishment;
- (4) Reviewing language and cultural training curricula and making adjustments as appropriate;
- (5) Studying the interrelationship of variable officer career lengths, promotion-timing, and in-career compensation and benefits to ensure optimal career patterns and also determining the optimal active duty service obligation;
- (6) Completing a study already initiated on Service programs designed to prepare officers to serve as General/Flag Officers;
- (7) Validating retention metrics;
- (8) Conducting a study on an indefinite (re) enlistment option for enlisted members;
- (9) Given a commitment to systems that are more productive, and less manpower intensive, reviewing grade structure and qualitative requirements;
- (10) Reviewing opportunities to improve the alignment of manpower (spaces) and personnel (faces), and their supporting management systems;
- (11) Achieving cost-effective human resource programs.

Line of Operation 4: Transition members from Active Status

As a Department we recognize that it is important to transition members in a way that fosters respect for their Service and encourages transitioning members to be positive spokespersons for the military way of life. Key actions to accomplish this objective include:

- (1) Studying the means of enhancing participation, portability, vesting and equity of military retirement alternatives and propose appropriate recommendations;
- (2) Enhancing programs that assist members in transitioning between components, other government service and/or the private sector;
- (3) Reviewing programs designed to inform members of transition benefits.


Line of Operation 5: Sustain the process and maintain its viability

While this objective does not pertain to the personnel life cycle, it does ensure that the military human resource strategy remains a viable and relevant tool to manage the military human resources of the Department. The primary action under this objective is to establish a process and forum to review regularly the progress on actions in the plan and to re-evaluate the plan on a routine basis to ensure it still meets the current and future needs of the department.

APPENDIX A

RAND STUDY: THE PRESENT MILITARY PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK: WHERE IT CAME FROM; SEP 2002

PROJECT MEMORANDUM



The Present Military Personnel Management Framework: Where It Came From

Harry J. Thie, Jefferson P. Marquis

PM-1247-OSD

September 2001

National Defense Research Institute

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PREFACE

The Director for Officer and Enlisted Personnel Management in USD (P&R) asked that we prepare a paper on the framework for military personnel management systems that summarizes how the present framework came to be. We were given maximum leeway to provide whatever information we believed best contributed to an understanding of present practices. This paper includes some prior work but also introduces new data, concepts, and ideas.

We are indebted to colleagues Meg Harrell, Jerry Sollinger, and Susan Everingham for numerous suggestions that improve the paper. Also, we thank Robin Cole for data preparation and administrative support.

This research was conducted for the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness within the Forces and Resources Policy Center of RAND's National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the unified commands, and the defense agencies.

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**WHERE ARE WE NOW? HOW DID WE GET HERE? WHAT IS THE FRAMEWORK FOR THE
SYSTEMS OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT CURRENTLY IN USE?**

The present military personnel management framework is more an accretion of functional policies and practices to fit past environments and solve past problems than a system designed to meet current and future mission needs, i.e., to be strategic. The existing framework is a static, uniform policy system. However, forces that cannot be accommodated without frequent structural adjustments constantly beset that framework.

This paper attempts three things. First, it describes the current force and traces its evolution. It does so by chronicling how a variety of factors have influenced the size of the force, the ratio between officers and enlisted personnel, the occupations, and the grade and experience levels. Informing this chronicle is the implicit point that any attempt to establish a strategic personnel framework must imbue that framework with sufficient flexibility to respond to the types of influences that history shows will appear again and again. Second, it defines a military personnel management framework and then describes the very different frameworks that have evolved for the enlisted and officer corps. Finally, it offers some suggestions about developing a strategic human resources framework.

WHERE ARE WE NOW? HOW DID WE GET HERE?

The size of the force and its grade, occupation, and experience distribution result from the interplay of multiple factors including external events (buildups and drawdowns); missions, organization, and technology; individual behaviors; and law and policy. The latter—the military personnel management framework—mandates or fosters individual behaviors in response to the other factors.

Size and Officer-Enlisted Composition

The military services are large organizations, compared with private sector organizations. Figure 1 shows the strength by service

and the number of officers and enlisted in each. The Army is largest; the Marine Corps smallest. The current ratio of enlisted to officer varies from around 9:1 in the Marine Corps to 6:1 in the Navy, 5:1 in the Army, and 4:1 in the Air Force.




Fig 1. Size of Active Component May 2001

The size of the force has varied largely as a result of national security needs driven by external events. In WWII, the active military had nearly 12 million members with some 1.1 million officers. Then followed the post-World War II drawdown in the late 1940s; the Korean War in the early 1950s with its own subsequent drawdown; the Berlin Crisis, which added manpower in the early 1960s; the Vietnam conflict with its own era of growth and drawdown. The debacle at Desert One was followed in the 1980s by the Reagan buildup, the fall of the Berlin Wall, Grenada, and Panama. In the 1990s, the breakup of the former Soviet Union, the Persian Gulf conflict, and participation in humanitarian efforts and operations other than war had significant

effects. Last, the 1990s have witnessed a sharp reduction in the size of the active military.

Figure 2 highlights size differences for the last 50 years for each service with respect to their present size as shown in Figure 1.




Fig 2. Service Strength (1950-2000) As a Percent of 2000 Strength

The Army has always been the most affected by the cycle of buildup and draw down. During both Korea and Vietnam, the Army was over 3 times as large as it is presently. After those two conflicts, it dropped to about one and one-half times its present size. When we examine the military personnel management policy framework, it is clear that either the framework must be flexible enough to accommodate changes of this magnitude in the size of the Army or it must allow temporary "workarounds" that enable the Army force structure to expand or contract substantially and quickly.

Historically, missions, organization, and technology have determined the size of the Air Force. Furthermore, as the Air Force has

improved its capabilities, it has reduced its need for manpower. One indication of this is that the Air Force now has 12,000 pilots as compared to 50,000 during the Korean War. A personnel policy framework must thus accommodate productivity and capability improvements as well as changes in missions, organization, and technology.

The size of the Navy and especially the Marine Corps has historically remained rather stable and shaped by the need for presence. While ups and downs in Korea and Vietnam did occur, they were not of the magnitude of those experienced by the Army. The Navy has seldom been twice its present size, and the Marine Corps has only once been more than one and one half its present size. The peak of the Marine Corps size compared to the present is about the same as the valley of the Army size compared to the present. Thus, a policy framework must also account for stability and cannot be premised only on surges in size and changes in mission, organization, and technology.

The ratio between the enlisted and officer force has also changed. Figure 3 presents the enlisted to officer ratio for each service from 1950-2000. These ratios have tended downward in all of the services even as differences among services remained relatively constant.




Fig 3. Ratio of Enlisted to Officer (1950-2000)

The active military "force in being" emerged after the Spanish American War and expanded significantly during WWI. However, officer strength did not increase as much as enlisted during this period, which accounts for the high enlisted-officer ratio for the first twenty years of the century--it was about 20:1. Before World War I, brawn still mattered most on the battlefield. Coal-fired ships, dismounted infantry, and horse-drawn artillery required proportionally more enlisted personnel.

The data show a significant shift from enlisted to officer manpower since World War I. The introduction of the airplane, the tank, the modern steam-ship, and the radio shifted the workload toward more use of brain than brawn. New technologies tend to be officer heavy when first introduced because they are initially complex and require doctrinal and organizational change. Technological innovations also initially require a larger, officer-rich, support tail to provide service and supply.

Moreover, beginning in World War II and continuing to the present, the need to coordinate, integrate, and sustain military forces numbering in the millions, rather than the tens of thousands, led to a substitution of officers for enlisted personnel to staff increasingly larger and more hierarchical organizations as well as the simple addition of more officers. Since W. W. II, there has been a downward trend with less frequent spikes in the ratio¹, as officers have come to represent a larger proportion of a large active military.

Obviously, this downward trend cannot continue forever. Looking backward, a military personnel framework must accommodate large swings in officer and enlisted composition largely as a result of mission, organization, and technology. Looking forward, it is reasonable, for reasons to be outlined later, to assume that the enlisted force will begin to increase relative to the officer force but for both forces to be more highly experienced and graded. A policy framework must accommodate swings in both directions.

Grades

The number of grades in the force has been reasonably stable: 10 commissioned officer², 5 warrant officer, 9 enlisted. Grades E8 and E9 and grades O9 and O10 were added in 1958 and grade W5 was added in 1993. The present quantified grade structure for each service appears in Figure 4.

¹ In times of conflict, the ratio tends to increase as proportionally more enlisted personnel are added.

² Grade O11 was used through September 1980.




Fig 4. Service Composition by Grade, May 2001

Figure 5 portrays the same data slightly differently. It compares service composition by grade. The most striking difference occurs in the warrant officer grades. The Air Force does not have warrant officers.³ The Army has about 6 times more warrant officers proportionally than either the Navy or Marine Corps. Even while proportionally more of the Marine Corps are in the junior grades, because the Army is largest of the services, it has the largest individual share of all grades up to O3 and of O7-O10. Of the other officer grades, the Air Force has the highest proportions among the services.

A personnel framework that strives for uniformity must recognize the influence of one service on another. The Navy and Marine Corps are affected by outcomes sought by the Army for enlisted and warrant officer management and by the Air Force for officer management. Each of those

³ The Air Force has not had warrant officers since 1979.

services has the dominant numbers in its respective groups and whatever policies one pursues will impinge on the ranks of other services in a uniform framework.




Fig 5. Grade Composition by Service, May 2001

Within each respective grade structure (enlisted, commissioned, and warrant), distributions have changed over the last 50 years by becoming generally more senior as shown in Figures 6, 7, and 8. Service differences exist, but each service's present average grade is higher than in earlier eras. The growth is most consistent in the enlisted force where it ranges between 12 to 16 percent over the period.




Fig 6. Average Enlisted Grade, 1958-2000

For commissioned officers, grade growth since the late 1970s is about 3 percent in the Army, 6 percent in the Air Force and Navy, and 15 percent in the Marine Corps. Cycles are evident in both the enlisted and particularly in the commissioned officer force as cohorts of different entry sizes work their way through the system over time and confront promotion phase points. (The controlled grade tables for O4-O6 have increased several times since 1980.)




Fig 7. Average Commissioned Officer Grade, 1958-2000

For warrant officers, the cycles are pronounced in the Navy and Marine Corps. There is more stability in the Army because of the larger numbers of warrant officers. Grade averages have increased, and the Marine Corps now has a higher grade average than the Army.




Fig 8. Average Warrant Officer Grade, 1958-2000

Differently sized entry cohorts, advancement and retention patterns, and grade controls have trend and cyclical effects in a closed system that differ by service and category of the workforce. These dynamic effects, also reflecting higher levels of responsibility and higher compensation, must be accommodated within a personnel framework.

Occupations

Each service has a distinct occupational or skill mix. The officer distribution is shown in Figure 9 and the enlisted distribution appears in Figure 10.⁴

⁴ For these portrayals, the DoD Occupational Coding System is aggregated as follows. Officer: General Military (Tactical Operations Officers), Technical (Intelligence, Engineering/Maintenance, Scientist/Professionals, Health Care), Administrative (Administrators), Service and Supply (Supply/Procurement). Enlisted: General Military (Infantry/Seamanship), Technical (Electronic Repair, Other Tech/Allied, Communications/Intelligence, Health Care), Administrative (Functional

The Marine Corps has the highest percentage of its officer force in general military occupations. The Air Force has the most technical personnel proportionally. The Navy is second in each category. The service and supply/administrative occupations range from 14 percent in the Navy to 26 percent in the Marine Corps.




Fig 9. Officer Occupational Distribution, 2001

The Marine Corps and Army have the highest proportions of enlisted personnel in the general military category. The Navy has the most technical people and the Marine Corps the least. Included in the Navy technical category are health services personnel, many of whom minister to the Marine Corps. Craftsmen account for large proportions of enlisted personnel in the Navy and the Air Force.

Support/Administrative), Service and Supply (Service and Supply Handlers), Craftsmen (Craftsmen, Electric/Mechanical Repair).




Fig 10. Enlisted Occupational Distribution, 2001

Figure 11 provides a side-by-side comparison of the two distributions. While the percent distributions differ (there are no craftsmen in the officer corps), the relative share by service is similar in the enlisted and officer occupational distributions. For example, there are more general military personnel in the Marine Corps than in the other services and a higher number of technical people in the Navy and Air Force than in the other two services.




Fig 11. Enlisted and Officer Occupational Distribution, 2001

This occupational distribution is far from static. Figure 12 shows how the enlisted distribution has changed since the WWI era. The precipitous decline in jobs classified as general military is quite evident as is the equally marked increase in technical occupations and craftsmen.




Fig 12. Enlisted Occupational Distribution, 1918-2001

The organization of work and the composition of the military force changes with mission, organization, and technology. During the early years of the military, before WWI, there was little demand for occupational specialization. Most soldiers were infantry riflemen, although a few served in support activities. The Navy was the first to experience the effect of the Industrial Revolution. The shift from sails to steam was a far-reaching technological change. The Army lagged behind for several decades until the World War I mobilization, but the subsequent transformation was quite dramatic. The combat soldier for the first time was actually in a numerical minority.

Following World War II, several factors changed the occupational requirements of the services changes rather dramatically, e.g.: the acceleration of weapons and military technology to include the nuclear military; the application of electronics to communications and logistics, and the emergence of missiles and air defense.

Organizational structures changed to take advantage of the new armaments and processes. Another noticeable shift began in the occupational distribution, away from infantry, artillery, and seaman skills and toward technical fields. By 1984 technical workers constituted the largest of the five separate groupings.⁵ As of 2001, 18 percent of the enlisted force were in a general military specialty, 34 percent were blue-collar (service and supply workers and craftsmen), and 48 percent were white-collar workers administrative and technical workers). The percentages of service and supply, craftsmen, and administrative has begun to decrease in recent years.

A personnel management framework must be able to accommodate a shifting occupational mix. Policy designed for what was once a dominant occupational group without a direct counterpart in the private sector must change to address differently sized occupational groups with different private sector competition. A one-size-fits-all policy may not be appropriate for all occupations, especially when no one occupation dominates.

Experience

Figure 13 shows the present experience distribution for each service with officer and enlisted aggregated together. The Marine Corps is most junior, and the Air Force is most senior.

⁵ Another major milestone in workforce composition occurred in 1985. For the first time, more selective reservists and DoD civilian employees than active military were in the defense workforce.




Fig 13. Distribution of Years of Service, May 2001

Figure 14 shows how the enlisted experience for each service has changed over time. Certain patterns are noticeable, particularly for the Army and Marine Corps. During past buildups (e.g., Vietnam), average experience goes down, especially as conscripts enter for two-year terms of service. Moreover, in such periods, retention also decreases for all services. With the advent of the All-Volunteer force and especially the Reagan administration, enlisted experience has increased significantly. A personnel management framework must not only deal with relatively junior and relatively senior forces but must be able to accommodate the change between the two.




Fig 14. Enlisted Experience, 1953-1999

However, it is not just changes in average experience that must be accommodated. Various periods of significant buildup and drawdown, and even relatively minor strength changes, cause tidal waves of experience surges in a static, cohort (year group) based system. This is illustrated in Figure 15, which portrays the distribution of experience for Navy officers in selected periods. For several of these periods, an "average" experience level would be completely misleading. The force was junior and senior, not average.




Fig 15. Navy Officer Experience, Selected Periods

A personnel management framework must be able to adjust to these wide swings in experience over short periods of time. And the swings occur constantly as Figure 16 shows. The point of the figure is to highlight the tremendous peaks and valleys that occur in experience, with sharp spikes occurring in the early years of a cohort during buildups with those spikes continuing into the future. Behind the peaks in a closed system come the valleys. Being able to manage a constantly changing experience distribution across periods of time is one of the more difficult tasks that a personnel management framework must accomplish.




Fig 16. Navy Officer Experience Distribution, 1953-2000

PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK

The next section reviews the personnel management frameworks that existed at various periods of time and how the current framework evolved. Much of officer policy derives from law; enlisted policy tends to follow officer policy but with greater flexibility and less uniformity across services and across occupations in some services. Policy for warrant officers also has derived from officer legislation. For the most part, policy initiatives affecting size, grade, and experience have been easier to negotiate and implement culturally than policies that would differentiate among occupations within or across services. In many respects, the framework at any given time was created as a response to the immediate past, and each framework needed to change as the size and composition of the force changed and evolved as people made individual decisions within the framework. The grade system

envisioned by the Officer Personnel Act (OPA) in 1947 could not fit the promotion practices of 1955, and the Officer Grade Limitation Act (OGLA) emerged. OGLA could not handle grade and experiences changes. The Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) was created to fix grades and promotions but could not adjust to the size, experience, and retention increases of the Reagan era and to specialized occupational needs. In the 80s and 90s, further management changes were introduced for officers serving in particular positions, e.g., joint and acquisition. Each new system may have been "over-controlling" in one or more functional aspects without enough flexibility across all of them to look forward as environment, mission, organization, and technology changed. Policy was systematic in that it was evenly applied but not systemic or strategic.

WHAT IS A FRAMEWORK?

A framework is a general personnel system for bringing people into a workforce, moving them horizontally and vertically through successively more broadening or challenging positions, and separating them voluntarily or involuntarily at certain exit points. This "flow" framework is not unlike the interstate highway system with controlled entry and exit ramps, minimum and maximum speed limits, service stations, toll booths, and scenery—some prettier than others. The intent of the interstate system is to move a large volume of traffic quickly to known ends. This controlled framework is most different from off-road driving where neither start, stop, nor route is well discerned. The intent of the off-road system is to allow nearly complete freedom for specialized vehicles to go where, when, and how desired within very broad constraints. (Many assert that career planning in the United States is moving in this direction with the "drivers" becoming responsible for both destination and movement to it.) The interstate system is also more structured than the regional, state, and local highway system where many more choices are possible in where to start, where to end, which route to take, where to get services, at what speed to move, and how pretty the journey might be. The intent of this last

system is to balance volume, speed, and scenery for a wide range of drivers and vehicles, support services, and destinations.

Probably the most important question to be answered in a strategic personnel management system is how much rigid structure is needed in the framework. How uniform must it be? How much flexibility can be allowed? What strategy is it designed to meet? What is its intent?

Enlisted Personnel Management: How Did the Present Framework Come About?

For most of the military history of the United States, the answers to the classic questions of how many soldiers, sailors, airmen (after the 1920s), and marines; in what skills; and of how much experience largely depended on external events. When the nation needed to increase the size of the military, it enlisted or conscripted recruits from the general population; when the need abated, these recruits were equally quickly separated.

During most of the Cold War force requirements were based on a global conflict scenario. NATO was formed, and the United States entered into other regional alliances. The national defense acts of 1946-1949 were significant in setting long-term direction for a newly created Department of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff. The nation had a volunteer force from 1946 to 1950, but Korea saw a return to conscription. Vietnam manpower policy was dominated by conscription to meet the needs of the Army; the needs of the other services and the reserve component were met largely with draft-induced volunteers. Total Force Policy (implemented in 1971) and the all-volunteer force of 1973 had significant effects on requirements for active enlisted and on the supply of men and women. Along with these, a host of other factors also affected the size, skill, and experience composition of the force. For example, the continuing application of science and technology to warfare led to increased specialization and growth in capability through capital rather than labor. Particular doctrines for certain types of situations made low-intensity warfare more important. Greater use of officers, civilians, and contractors reduced the need for enlisted, especially junior enlisted.

Many military personnel policies for the enlisted force emerged both as a reaction to the military needs of the time and as a reflection of societal concerns for the military. Domestic priorities such as budget concerns also played a role. For example, President Truman racially integrated the force by executive order in the late 1940s, although the full effect of his action would be seen only during the Korean War. Twenty-year retirements were made possible in 1948. Limits on the number of woman recruits and the jobs they were able to perform were also established in 1948. The next year saw significant compensation reform, and there have been other significant adjustments to compensation since then. While the Armed Forces Qualification Test was first administered in 1950, testing of military personnel goes back to World War I. Universal Military Training became law in 1951. Reenlistment bonuses were implemented in 1954 to try to keep experienced people in the force.

The late 1960s and early 1970s saw the beginning of the modern era of enlisted personnel management.⁶ The adoption of the all-volunteer force in 1973 was perhaps the most significant event of the last 50 years. Since then, all the military services have had to compete for qualified people in the marketplace, and thus the services and OSD have had to take enlisted personnel management more seriously. By removing the "free good" element from military manpower, Pentagon managers were challenged to pay more attention to efficiency issues and to the notion of tradeoff analyses. For example, the growing costs of attracting volunteers forced a reassessment of the youth versus experience issue, which eventually led to changes in the first-term/career ratio. The OSD, as the central body responsible for force management, began to establish objectives for smoothing the "profiles"—the numbers of people

⁶Before this period, personnel management was decentralized and individuals were largely responsible for their own "careers." For example, the 1950 edition of the privately published *Noncom's Guide* treated many of today's important personnel issues in but one of 28 chapters on military service. Treated at the same level of importance with a paragraph or page in this one chapter were such issues as enlistment, personnel classification, appointment of NCOs, transfers, and retirement as well as duty rosters, morning reports, venereal disease control, and the Pentagon Philatelic Society.

in various years of service in each of the military services. The objective was to avoid "humps" and "valleys" in force management.

Changes in policy to aid recruitment and retention to smooth the transition to an all-volunteer force were made in 1973 and 1974, with enlistment bonuses and selective reenlistment bonuses (SRBs)⁷ becoming more widely available for use. In the late 1970s, concerns about low personnel quality and the "hollow force" prompted managers to deal with issues such as personnel turbulence, the size of the first-term and career forces, and assignment policy. The ASVAB enlistment test became official in 1976 (immediately before this, the services set their own aptitude standards in selected areas on centrally administered tests). However, during the late 1970s, lower-quality people entered the force having mistakenly been classified as "higher-quality" personnel because the test was misnormed.⁸

The early 1980s saw growth in the size of the force and significant increases in compensation. An increased emphasis on family matters began in 1981 with the creation of family policy offices. Retirement reform and changes in tour lengths were enacted in 1986. The following year saw the enactment of the Montgomery GI Bill and the implementation of the Women in the Military Study (DoD, 1983), which had important implications for the future of women recruits. In the late 1980s, DoD began to structure its recruiting on a gender-neutral basis and began to consider early-release programs to reduce size. In the 1990s, tremendous changes in tenure, promotion practice, and voluntary incentives to leave were needed to accommodate the drawdown, and these changes renewed the debate about how to best manage an enlisted force.

⁷Some form of retention incentive has existed since the Revolutionary War. The SRB, which is geared toward skill needs, replaced a series of incentives that were paid to all reenlistees or only to first-term enlistees.

⁸This misnorming had a substantial influence on the overall proficiency of the enlisted force for over two decades. It also provided a valuable lesson for manpower managers who placed their faith in the erroneous test results and who initially ignored reports from the field that the ability of people they were receiving fell far short of expectations.

These actions and legislation notwithstanding, Congress has seldom involved itself with the management of the enlisted force to the extent that it has managed the officer corps. Certainly, none of the legislation enacted for enlisted personnel had quite the significance or the comprehensiveness of the Officer Personnel Act (1947), the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (1980), or Goldwater-Nichols (1986). Congress has mandated controls on the number of personnel who can be at grade E8 or E9 and on the overall size of the enlisted force, but in general, except when problems arose, Congress has allowed the DoD to manage the enlisted force.⁹

The debate about enlisted personnel policy has consistently focused on certain issues: budget controls, grade inflation, grade controls, experience levels, promotion timing, promotion opportunity, promotion by skill, grade shortages, and programmed manning. These are arcane subjects usually argued between the policy and budget communities. While important, they seem not to be systemic or strategic as they were argued. Periodically, larger issues are addressed. For example, a 1954 DoD Directive provided guidance for manpower programs. The stated objective was to

accomplish approved national military objectives with a minimum of manpower so organized and employed as to provide maximum effectiveness and combat power...each service shall seek optimum personnel utilization, maintain a high level of personnel performance and morale, and accomplish missions with a minimum number of personnel.

To this end, the following steps, among others, were directed:

- Correlate job requirements and personnel qualifications;
- Maintain the grade requirement of each space consistent with its responsibility;
- Maximize stability of assignments and minimize rotation or turnover consistent with requirements of training, readiness, and morale; and

⁹ Congress has not hesitated to step in. For example, the present recruiting goals for high-quality enlistees are largely a result of Congressional interest and action.

- Encourage voluntary enlistment and reenlistment to increase the level of training, experience, and combat readiness and minimize involuntary induction.

These management objectives and programs from 1954 still seem applicable today. In particular, it is apparent that reenlistment results were the perceived key to increased experience and readiness. The systemic relationship of reenlistments to accessions was apparent--keeping an experienced person meant one less person had to be recruited or conscripted.

In 1974 OSD established a requirement that each service develop enlisted personnel management systems that would allow them to avoid the peaks and valleys in their experience profiles that had plagued them to date. The Vietnam conflict had just ended and the all-volunteer force had just begun. DoD (1974) defined the goal of enlisted personnel management as follows: "to support the most efficient allocation of Department of Defense manpower resources in support of Military Service missions." It established ceilings for E8 and E9 (a maximum of 3 percent of the enlisted force),¹⁰ and stated that the proportion of those in the top 5 grades could not be higher than the proportion of those having more than four years of service.¹¹ It established target promotion points for each grade (for example, seven years for promotion to E6) but did not establish policies limiting reenlistment of those who repeatedly failed promotion selection, although each service established thresholds beyond which point the service members were not allowed to continue.

¹⁰Constraints on the top enlisted grades were mandated by Congress and have existed in Title 10 since 1962.

¹¹It appears that this mandate about the career force and TOP 5 relationship perfectly fit the needs and data of the day. As Vietnam accession needs wound down and as retention began to increase, this long-standing relationship reemerged. It is not clear that promotion mandates had nearly the effect of reduced accessions and increased retention in achieving it. However, this relationship is always easier for a high retention service (and thus proportionally larger career force) to achieve than a lower retention service to achieve. For example, during the period 1953 to 1994, the Air Force career force has always exceeded the TOP 5 relationship. However, the Marine Corps did not achieve the mandate at any time between 1965 and 1981.

A key provision of the directive required that each service develop an objective force profile that is a target distribution by years of service and pay grade for each occupational grouping in the force and for the enlisted force as a whole. The objective force profile was to serve as the basis for service force management actions and policies aimed at achieving it. Although these profiles are now used to show the effect of policy changes on experience and to align the force mathematically by cohort year group, they were initially developed primarily to control personnel costs.

A careful study of the period suggests a devolution of officer duties to noncommissioned officers. Many types of work, from administration and paperwork to launching of missiles, have become sergeant and petty officer work. Largely, this is because technology and the rapidity of operations have mandated that responsibility move downward. Aspects of this devolution of duties can also be seen in changing concepts of personnel development. Training, a skill-based concept that results in immediate ability to do certain tasks more proficiently, is slowly giving way to education of the enlisted force as a knowledge-based force becomes needed for successful performance.

The enlisted force is more highly educated than in any previous era. Even in the occupational group associated with Army and Marine Corps combat skills (general military), the proportion with at least some college is much greater than was generally believed to be achievable in the era of a conscription-shaped enlisted force. Moreover, in the private sector in the United States "quality jobs" are perceived as those that require more education, greater tenure (experience), and higher compensation (grades).¹² The enlisted force is increasingly moving in that direction.

Some have suggested that the noncommissioned officer corps itself is becoming more professional in the model of the officers, i.e., NCOs and petty officers must learn a rigorous body of military science and art through education and experience and must adhere to formal values. Indicators of this trend toward professionalism include increasing

¹²See, for example, Rosenthal (1989).

education levels among mid-level and senior enlisted members, founding of academic-degree-granting institutions such as the Air Force's Community College of the Air Force, the emergence and elaboration of enlisted professional military education, the increasing status and voice of senior enlisted advisors at both service headquarters (e.g., Sergeant Major of the Army) and field units, and the emergence and evolution of NCO-oriented professional organizations. Although the enhanced status of enlisted personnel may not fully conform to conventional definitions of a profession, it appears to be taking on more of the hallmarks of a profession and less those of a trade. This has important implications for the division of responsibilities between the officer and enlisted forces. Specifically, as the relative balance of human capital between junior officers and senior enlisted members shifts in favor of senior enlisted members, scope of responsibility, job design, status, and compensation issues arise. An organization would want to make a variety of personnel management changes in each area to get the full value from this part of the workforce.

Officer Personnel Management: How Did the Present Framework Come About?

Up until about 1916, officer personnel management was piecemeal and functional and usually subordinated service needs to officer prerogatives. Problems were attacked periodically dealing with accessing, promoting, and separating officers, but seldom did policymakers focus on developing officers, i.e., training, educating, and broadening their experience. Different solutions for common problems were proffered for the War Department and the Navy Department. The Army had West Point in 1809; a Naval Academy was debated for years until authorized for 1845. A more universal program of training prospective officers prior to entry did not exist until before WWI. Promoting was the most vehemently argued function over the years both in terms of uniform application to different occupations (which officers should be promoted) and the workings of the seniority system. Promotion was purely based on seniority until the early 1900s in the Navy and until after WWII in the Army. Everyone got promoted; you just had to wait your turn. A history of Navy officer management from 1793 to 1941

is not surprisingly entitled *Waiting For Dead Men's Shoes*. Moreover, until the 1870s, the only way to leave service was to quit, die, or become disabled. The idea of retirement took hold after the Civil War as a means to leave service with an old age payment.

For much of the past fifty years, a consensus has existed within the defense policy community on a structured approach to managing the size of the officer corps that would supply the appropriate number of officers for both wartime and peacetime requirements. The role the United States played in WWII and in the early Cold War convinced Congress that in spite of a very large demobilization there was a "continuing need for many thousands of temporary officers for years into the future." Congress provided a permanent career plan for Regular Army and Regular Navy officers, and yet, at the same time, authority was provided for carrying along 30,000 to 40,000 temporary officers for some years. Congress' hope was that it could reduce the officer corps over the course of the decade after WWII. Much of this mindset has continued to the present day even though current policies call for use of reservists to expand the force.

In the Officer Personnel Act of 1947, Congress imposed tight controls on permanent promotions but none over temporary promotions in the Army and the Air Force and only limited ones over temporary promotions in the Navy and Marine Corps. In response to a growing concern over temporary promotions and the number of officers holding high grade, Congress established grade limitations through amendments to the budget and in 1954 passed the Officer Grade Limitation Act (OGLA), which imposed statutory limitations on the number of regular and reserve officers who could serve in the grades of major and above (and Navy equivalents).

Despite these efforts, the number of senior officers continued to grow disproportionately as large Korean War accession cohorts aged (particularly in the Air Force), necessitating annual grade relief legislation. This problem was compounded in the "hollow military" era of the 1970s by the difficulty in retaining promising junior officers. Ultimately, Congress responded with the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) of 1980, which reformed the jury-rigged system of

active and reserve officer commissions and grade controls that had emerged since the end of WWII. Among other things, DOPMA provided that the number of officers allowed in each field grade above O-3 would be determined by Congress based on total officer end-strength. In addition, DOPMA did away with separate temporary and permanent promotion systems, provided that all active-duty officers would become regular officers after eleven years of service, and declared that regular officers could not be involuntarily separated after five years of service, unless they had failed consecutively to be selected for promotion. DOPMA set up a carefully balanced set of constraints on officer management, based on mathematical interactions of accession, retention, and promotion.

In sum, DOPMA provided many tools to "grow" the officer corps, but it made the involuntary separation of career officers more difficult. This did not seem to be a problem during the period of the Reagan military build-up of the early 1980s, given the high demand for more (and more highly graded) commissioned officers. Under the DOPMA rules, the increased end-strength (made up of mostly junior officers) instantaneously increased the number of allowable field grade-officers. As a result, the DOPMA system treated company-grade and field-grade officers in service at the start of the Reagan build-up to a windfall as promotion opportunities rose and as the time between promotions decreased. However, these higher levels of promotion opportunity and shorter promotion cycles could be maintained only if officer end-strength were allowed to stay high or grow indefinitely—a situation that did not happen.

Faced with the general drawdown in U.S. military forces at the end of the Cold War, DoD found it increasingly difficult in the late 1980s to meet end strength and grade table limits and adhere to reasonable promotion opportunities and timing, while remaining within the tenure constraints imposed by DOPMA. The voluntary early-out program, early retirement boards, and other DOPMA-authorized tools proved insufficient to reduce the force in a balanced way as quickly or deeply as proposed. As a result, Congress agreed to ease DOPMA rules to permit the involuntary separation of military personnel, beginning with the FY 1991

Authorization Act, which permitted the Secretary of Defense during a five-year period to shorten the period of selective continuation, expand selective early retirement, and convene selection boards to discharge regular officers. The FY 1992 and 1993 National Defense Authorization Act further enhanced the services' ability to "shape" the force through involuntary separation--albeit only after offering service members a choice of two voluntary incentive programs.

Since the early 1990s, DOPMA's inflexibility in managing the post-Cold War reduction of the military has been criticized. DOPMA forces a choice among grade-table violations (law), diminution of proffered tenure (law), or proffered promotion opportunity/timing (policy, promise). In general, the solution chosen was a further loosening of the DOPMA rules, particularly to overcome problems created by the instantaneous nature of the grade tables which were also loosened several times in the 1980s and 1990s by Congress.

The relative merits of uniformity and specialization have been at the heart of the debate over managing the composition of the officer corps in the postwar period. As they struggled to create a permanent military establishment in the early years of the Cold War, key defense reformers in Congress and the administration were guided by two major impressions drawn from the last world war: 1) the senior military leadership, particularly in the Army, had largely lacked the vigor and creativity necessary to lead U.S. forces in the opening days of previous war; and 2) conflicts between the senior leadership in the Army and the Navy had prolonged the conflict longer than was necessary and had cost American lives.

To a great extent, these two impressions lay behind significant provisions of the Officer Personnel Act (1947) and National Security Act (1947), which, in different ways, stressed the need for greater uniformity among the services. To maintain a young and vigorous officer corps, the OPA provided that the Navy's up-or-out officer promotion system would be extended (up to a point) to the Army and the Air Force; tenure of a "successful" regular officer career in all services would be set for officers below flag rank at 30 years; and voluntary retirement

could take place upon reaching 20 years of commissioned service.¹³ For its part, the NSA attempted to create a more unified national military establishment with a Secretary of Defense at the top and a Joint Chiefs of Staff serving as a military advisory committee to the Secretary and the President.

Displeased with the incompleteness of the 1940s-era defense reforms—as well as what some considered a string of strategic and operational failures in Korea and Vietnam in the 1950s-60s and in Iran and Grenada in the 1970s-80s—defense experts, military, and politicians alike began arguing for a greater focus on military professionalism, on the one hand, and joint operations on the other. Along with the move to an all-voluntary military and increased benefits and recognition for military service, the objective of a more professional, combat-ready military was met with an improved up-or-out promotion systems for officers, with common promotion, separation, and retirement rules for all the services. As laid out in DOPMA (1980), the “up” portion of the “up-or-out” system provided that, in general, officers would move through the system in seniority “cohorts” originally determined by the year of commissioning, and compete for promotion to the next higher grade against other members of the group at set years-of-service points. The “out” portion of the “up-or-out” system provided that fully qualified officers “twice passed over for promotion, after a certain number of years, depending upon their particular grade, were to be separated from active service, and if eligible retired.” In 1991, legislation similar to DOPMA was approved for managing warrant officers

¹³ OGLA had one other provision of note. Concerned about too many officers voluntarily retiring (at half pay) at the 20-year mark, Congress set limits on voluntary retirements (the Van Zandt amendment) in the 1954 Defense Appropriations Act. Assuring the Congress during hearings on OGLA that there would be no wholesale retirements in returning to unrestricted 20-year departures (“It is probable that, in the future, the privilege of voluntary retirement after completion of 20 or more years of service will be exercised little...”), the military services won repeal of the restriction in section 402 of OGLA. The services’ predictions at the time that most successful officers would pursue a full 30-year career proved to be off the mark.

to include similar provisions for separating these technical specialists for failure of promotion even if fully qualified.

The movement to improve the joint operations capability of the military culminated in the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, which, revised and clarified the DoD operational chain of command and JCS functions and responsibilities (Title I); assigned the CJCS the role of chief military advisor (Title II); and established a joint officer specialty occupational category and personnel policies to provide incentives to attract officers to joint duty assignments (Title IV). Ironically, whereas the overall intent of the Goldwater Nichols Act was to create greater unity within DoD, the effect of Title IV was to foster the development of a new type of officer, educated and experienced in joint operations, whose career pattern diverged from the typical line officer.

The trend toward officer specialization was also evinced by the passage of the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) in 1990. Faced with a series of highly publicized defense-related procurement scandals in the 1980s—as well as an apparently diminishing lead over the Soviet Union in important areas of military technology—a majority in Congress became convinced that the skills and training of the professional warrior were inadequate for the job of acquiring sophisticated weaponry and support equipment. What was needed was a separate corps of acquisition professionals, with education and training in acquisition, who devoted most of their later careers to jobs in acquisition. DAWIA fulfilled this aim by establishing an Acquisition Corps for the various components of DoD, centralizing acquisition training management under a new Defense Acquisition University, and creating distinct career fields (e.g., program management, acquisition logistics) within the Acquisition Corps.

Most recently, responding to the Revolution in Business Affairs in the 1980s and '90s, stimulated by advances in information technology, as well as the corresponding Reinventing Government initiative, studies by the Defense Science Board and the Navy, among others, argued for a rethinking of the principles of defense personnel management. In particular, they contended that DoD's current static, centralized

approach to human resource management would hinder its ability to capitalize on future opportunities and recommended allowing different skill groups to be managed differently. To prosper in an increasingly complex domestic and global environment, the military would have to become less uniform and more specialized. Moreover, not only would service needs and officer prerogatives have to be accommodated, but the need for high levels of performance from the diverse organizations that used officers would have to be considered.

CONCLUSION

What, then, does all of the above mean for those who wish to design a strategic human resource framework? A thoughtful analysis of the history of military personnel management suggests that any attempt to develop a strategic framework must take into account at least four things.

First, for a framework to be strategic, it must focus on the external environment to include demographics/psychographics, economics, and mission. It cannot be simply inward looking, managing against a set of desired profiles. The framework must allow for a match of policy to intent and desired outcomes given a frequently changing external environment.

Second, the framework must work as a system. Accession is not a separately planned function from retention and retirement. The entire process of bringing people into the military, training, educating, promoting, assigning, developing, and separating them, must be viewed as an inter-linked system. There must be internal consistency among the functional parts of the system, and the system must accommodate and balance the needs of multiple stakeholders—the services, individual officers, and organizations that use officers.

Third, personnel managers must imbue any framework with sufficient flexibility to respond to the types of changes described here. Trends are at work and cycles are inevitable as world conditions and national priorities change. Instilling flexibility might involve fewer policy prescriptions and fewer controls. For example, the current system manages grades at several levels. Managing only a few grades, E9s and

06s for example, might make the overall system more robust against the inevitable change. The policy rules of the road might need to be broadened to allow more freedom of movement for the services as they manage people and for individuals within the system to meet their own needs. However, there may be negative, as well as positive, consequences associated with deregulating and decentralizing DoD's personnel system, e.g., diminished service identities, increased rivalries among the various communities, lesser ability to operate jointly, lesser understanding of one another's mission or the "common" interest, etc. These consequences must be either avoided or mitigated or accepted culturally.

Fourth, the framework should also be an active instrument of DoD's overall military strategy for the future. Human resources policy should play a more positive role in defense planning rather than the largely constraining role that it seems to play currently. In other words, to the extent possible, DoD should be trying to shape the future military work force toward mission need and desired outcomes instead of largely reacting to past changes in the external environment.

APPENDIX B

**GUIDANCE FROM
THE PRINCIPLES**

	SECDEF	DEPSECDEF	P&R	FMP
Personnel issues in general				
Flexibility	X			
Changing force	X		X	
Up or Out			X	
Quality of Life and Compensation				
Close pay gap	X			
Retain flexibility in key grades - pay raise	X			
Retirement - cliff vesting			X	
Spouse issues			X	X
Tour lengths				
Short tours of commanders			X	
Depth vs. Breadth	X		X	
Frequency of moves	X		X	
Tenure lengths				
Age at retirement	X			
Loss of expertise	X		X	
Civilian personnel				
DOD not in charge of	X		X	
Aging force - how to recruit and retain	X			
Aging force - opportunity to shape force	X			
Making changes to personnel policy				
Strategic Human Resource Plan			X	
Impact of change on entire system	X		X	
Need for additional analysis	X		X	
Slow process	X		X	
Ops/Perstempo				
Impact on retention	X	X		
Impact on families	X			
Housing and facilities				
Impact on retention	X			
Contracting out	X			
Health care	X		X	

On quality of life and compensation...

SECDEF Comments

- "One of the things that we did try to do in terms of attracting and retaining people is to retain some flexibility in key grades, where people were leaving in higher numbers and where we needed them most, with respect to the recent pay raise."¹
- "We've allowed compensation to become uncompetitive with the private sector."⁵
- "We need the funds for pay and housing and health care and quality of life."¹
- "The President...pointed out his interest in seeing that the compensation for the men and women of the armed services is competitive with the civilian manpower market."⁷

USD P&R Comments

- "...to the extent people [spouses] have been volunteered – to use as a verb – somewhat against their will, that is not a practice that we're prepared to endorse going forward."¹⁴
- "...we need to think of an alternative to our current cliff vesting system. The generic answer, of course, is to offer what people like to call a portable pension benefit. In fact, the Congress has already started to do this for us already by starting to create savings accounts, retirement savings accounts for military personnel."¹⁴

Dr Chu's writings prior to becoming P&R

- "Base compensation on military needs...It is time to consider a targeted compensation system."¹³
- "Take a systems approach to quality of life....the ultimate objective is attracting and retaining the people DoD needs, and enhancing their productivity....better focus DoD quality of life efforts [by] concentrating on determining what makes a difference to recruiting and retention, with a concentration on measuring and producing results."¹³

ASD(FMP) Comments

- "...top priorities will be to improve housing, stabilize deployment schedules, keep pushing for better military pay and provide enhanced job opportunities for military spouses."¹⁶

On tour lengths:

SECDEF Comments

- “If you’re in a position only a few months and then you’re gone, I think that’s not probably a great thing.”⁷
- “...if you ran a business this way you’d go broke awful fast.”⁸
- “...many...have very rapid changes of assignment...numbers are down around 12 months, 14 months, 16 months, 18 months. That’s not very long. One of the effects of that is they get into the job, just start learning it, and then it’s just about time to say goodbye and they’re out of it onto something else. The disadvantage of that is obvious; people don’t have enough time there to really set goals, put them in place and work them forward. The advantage of it is that individuals get a chance to do a variety of different things and punch a number of different tickets.”³
- “How can you run people through every 10, 12, 18 months in a job and expect them to know anything about the job? All they do is skip along the top of the waves. They don’t even know the mistakes they’ve made because they’re never there long enough to see them. There has to be a better way to do it.”⁸
- “It’s not clear to me that people should serve in their positions in the armed forces an average of only 12, 13, 14, 18 months, and that’s the case with a very high number of people – both officers and enlisted. I’m looking at that. It seems to me that having somewhat longer tours would be better.”⁷
- “For one thing, there would be fewer permanent changes of station.”⁷
- “...people would get to know their jobs better.”⁷
- “It’s helpful for people to see some mistakes that they make as they go through life. And if you skip along the tops of the waves and you’re gone before you ever have a chance to see the mistake you made and learn from it – and we don’t expect people not to make mistakes. Of course people make mistakes. But the important thing is to not keep making the same ones.”⁷
- “...I kept noticing that people that were in their jobs 6, 8, 10, 12, 13, 15 months. And general officers, flags. I know that if you had a need to punch a ticket to get your schooling, your training, to get your joint pieces under Goldwater/Nichols, there is tremendous pressure to do that. I also know that it’s difficult for people to really learn a job and then do it well enough and know what their mistakes were because you have to be around long enough to see some of it.”⁹

USD(P&R) Comments

- “Lengthening tours of duty would enable service members to “stay in a post longer, become more proficient at it and give more value back during that period of time.”¹⁴
- “If you want a longer tour average, it means people have fewer different experiences in preparing them for more senior responsibilities. And the issue, of course, is can I substitute some other vehicle for giving them that preparation than actually doing the job at some level.”¹⁴

On tenure length:

SECDEF Comments

- “It seems to me that people are living longer,...working longer...It seems to me in most entities across the globe that are successful financially, like private sector companies, they very much value people who are over 46.”³
- “And it’s not clear to me that we ought to bring people in, train them, benefit from their fine service, and then when they have so many years of wonderful service potential left, to suggest that it’s time for them to move out.”⁷
- “...if this were a corporation, would we want the very best to be leaving right then? It’s not clear to me we would.”⁷
- “...it may be that over some time we’ll be talking with folks about whether or not we ought to lengthen the number of years. And it wouldn’t have anything to do with how long someone had to serve or didn’t have to serve. I think with a volunteer force for the most part, we want people here who want to be here, who are anxious to serve, regardless of whether they’ve been here 10 or 20 or 30 years.”³
- “I’m musing over the fact that I keep talking to our most talented people – officer and enlisted – and when they get in their 40s they start thinking about doing something else. Should they retire, should they step aside, is the system kind of expecting you to leave at a certain point?”⁷
- [Discussing ADM Quigley, the OSD PA, who’s 47 and must leave – up or out – in two years] “...any company that would let him, or a person – we don’t want to get personal in here, but to let a person like that who’s at the top of his game and, to leave, is mindless.”⁹
- “Is the thought that maybe we ought not to bring people in, the best people we can find, train them, and then shove them out when they’re 46 or 47 or 48 years old?”⁹

USD(P&R) Comments

- “...we’re trying to jam too much into a 20-year career.”¹⁴
- “...why not longer careers for some?”¹⁴
- “....it’s really not so much a challenge to ‘up or out’ as it is a challenge to, well, what is the appropriate length of a career in the military, especially in a technocratic age where the skill set in senior personnel we’re calling on is not as physically dependent.”¹⁴
- “...how long would you like people to stay, and who is going to stay that length of time and who is going to stay some other length of time?”¹⁴

On civilian personnel...

SECDEF Comments

- "...be deft and flexible...attract and retain...very different civilian population in the Pentagon over the next 20 years..."¹
- "...we [DoD] don't have control over the civilian population, 600,000..."^{1, 6}
- "There's practically no information on the civilian side...isn't any data...What brings them in?"⁶

On the large number of civilians eligible for retirement:

- "...because of the large number of people that you don't know what they're going to do, but they have the option of retiring in a very short period of years, that it gives you an opportunity to make some judgements about how that force ought to be arranged and focused which you wouldn't have because you have so little control over them except for the fact that so many very likely will be leaving during a relatively short time."⁶
- "...change the mix or do whatever you wanted, because it's an opportunity that doesn't come along every year. It's also obviously an opportunity to change the age mix and with the age mix maybe the interest and capability mix. Fuel mix."⁶
- "...very high percentage in a very short period of years on a very big workforce....could be a big minus as well."⁶

Dr Chu's writings prior to becoming P&R

- "The current system is not consistent with the original model of civil service reform nor with the 1978 Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA). Rather it is a fractured, balkanized system that makes it difficult to make necessary adjustments to the new reality.... We are in no doubt that the system needs a complete overhaul."¹³
- "The goal is not civil service reform for its own sake, but the creation of an overall personnel management system that is adaptive to new requirements, responsive in meeting unforeseen needs, integrated with other management and decision-making processes, and innovative in solving problems."¹³
- "...bring about a system based in the DoD rather than the Office of Personnel Management, so that DoD has an integrated human resources management system – active and reserve military and civilian..."¹³

On making changes to personnel policy...

SECDEF Comments

- "...probably two years to really get the analysis that would be necessary to support a significant adjustment in how you were doing things." ⁶
- "...not the kind of thing that you can resolve or answer quickly. It will take a good deal of thought and analysis and discussion within the Department of Defense." ³
- "...will be recommendations for follow-on, things that need to be done or analyzed and we're going to probably have to go outside to get some analytical work done." ⁶
- "Changes in personnel systems have to be slow because they all ripple all the way up and down through that system. So you need to do a good deal of analytical work. You then need to implement those changes in a responsible way so they don't adversely affect people who have signed on under one system and then find a different system. And we're not going to swing the wheel this way and swing the wheel that way." ³
- "...of course anything like that is very difficult to do because changing a system causes linkages forward and back." ⁹

USD(P&R) Comments

- "... if we change what we want the results to be, we may have to change other elements of the system for those results to pertain." ¹⁴
- "You know, we have a winning hand here. The obvious issue will be, why should we change what is a very successful system?" ¹⁴
- "So you first need to rethink, as we're trying to do, rethink what the career pattern is going to look like and who you want to attract to that career pattern and how you want to have them assigned, how you want to motivate them and so on and so forth: then you start redesigning the pension plan." "...let's figure out first...what results do we want, what outcome do we want here; and then in order to achieve that outcome, what kind of pension system do we need for our people?" ¹⁴
- "And you also have to be looking at, as you think about all these different pieces of the puzzle, you have to be thinking about how those forces are disposed. In other words, where we put them around the world and what we expect of them; what's our, as it were, our social compact with the military member and his or her family." ¹⁴
- "So I think that we all benefit by reminding ourselves that historically, big changes in American security posture tend to happen gradually, not all at once." ¹⁴

On tempo...

SECDEF Comments

- "...op tempo has been a problem. And that is part of morale and it's part of quality of life." ²
- "...it has to be done at a level that's rational, that doesn't wear people out, that doesn't drive people away from this institution, because we need the best people." ³
- "In some cases, recruitment and retention is actually higher among groups that deploy than don't..." "On the other hand, it can be very disrupting for families. And the other thing it causes, a lot of people do these long overseas deployments that are just 179 days and they're just short of a trigger that would change their circumstance. So we're working on it. And I am doing things to try to find ways to moderate it." ³
- "I have been working with the Department of State and Colin Powell and the National Security Council...working with the CINCs and we're going to have a review of their engagement plan." ³
- "...something we've got to address...that we do not over-use the people, that we don't over-use our equipment, for example, and over-use the human beings who are so critically important to our success." ⁷
- "I see an awful lot of deployment orders for 179 days, and it's not clear to me that makes an awful lot of sense either. That's just under the threshold." ⁷
- "They're our service people and we've got an optempo problem. And it's difficult for families. And I darn well intend to do something about it." ⁹

DEPSECDEF Comments

- "And all of those day-to-day commitments we call force management risk, and that's the risk that drive your OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO up to the point that you lose the people that you need to keep." "...the way the system's been structured for the last ten years, the combination of the analytical framework and the shrinking resources have tended to put too much strain on the OPTEMPO/PERSTEMPO...." ¹²

USD(P&R) Comments

- "...the department is looking at creating a new definition for readiness and a new methodology for measuring readiness." ¹⁴

On housing and facilities....

SECDEF Comments

- "Sixty percent of all military housing is substandard"¹
- "We have an obligation to make certain those men and women have decent training and facilities..."²
- "...there is no way we can say that we have provided the kinds of housing and facilities for the men and women in the armed forces to work in that we would be proud of."²
- "I...looked at some of that housing and it is just – some of it is just terrible. It is – as well as some of the facilities. I mean, there's asbestos, there's leaded paint curling off. It is disgraceful."³
- "...risks of not properly taking care of our infrastructure is one that is very serious, and for some reason, it's been tail-end Charlie."³
- "...you see the paint peeling off and you see the asbestos and you look at the places where we're asking these people to live, and it is personalized."⁸
- "...[the President] believes that the housing should be appropriate for the men and women in the armed services and feels that a great deal of it is not appropriate."⁷
- "...look at the quality of the housing that we're asking these people, the men and women in the armed services to live in, you can't help but be floored."¹⁰
- "...sends a terrible signal to the people that you're trying to attract and retain in the armed forces. These are human beings."¹⁰
- "I think we ought to consider contracting out commissaries, housing, some mess halls and other services..."⁴

On health care...

SECDEF Comments

- “We...have a very serious issue with respect to health care.” ¹¹
- “...we have made every effort to arrange to see that this budget is going to fully fund that.” ¹
- “The actual delivery of the services falls short, in my view , and we need to work very hard at it...”¹

USD(P&R) Comments

- “Quality health care is one of the key pillars in our compensation system. Time and again, studies identify health care as a key factor in the satisfaction and quality of life of our service men and women and their families.” ¹⁵

- 1 SecDef Testimony before the HAC: FY02 Defense Budget Request, July 16, 2001
- 2 SecDef Testimony before the SASC: Defense Strategy Review, June 21, 2001
- 3 SecDef Town Hall Meeting, Aug 9, 2001
- 4 SecDef Testimony before the HASC: FY02 National Defense Authorization Budget Request
- 5 SecDef Interview with the Armed Forces Information Service, May 29, 2001
- 6 SecDef Interview with Group of Reporters, July 11, 2001
- 7 SecDef Interview with the Armed Forces Radio and Television, May 29, 2001
- 8 SecDef Interview with the Business Week, June 19, 2001
- 9 SecDef Interview with the Washington Post, July 22, 2001
- 10 SecDef Interview with the Wall Street Journal, May 22, 2001
- 11 SecDef Interview with the New York Times, May 1, 2001
- 12 DepSecDef Interview with the New York Times, July 28, 2001
- 13 Dr Chu, Ensuring Quality People in Defense, *Keeping the Edge, Managing Defense for the Future*, Chapter 8, 2001
- 14 USD(P&R) at DoD News Briefing, August 8, 2001
- 15 USD(P&R) Remarks at TRICARE Management Agency Change of Command, June 7, 2001
- 16 Mr. Charles Abell, SASC Confirmation Hearing, April 24, 2001

APPENDIX C

**QUESTIONS TO BE
ADDRESSED**

C

QUESTIONS TO BE ADDRESSED BY THE HR STRATEGIC PLAN

- 1. What kind of personnel and information systems are required to respond to changing roles and responsibilities of the military, civilian, and contractor workforce and the changing demands on the various components of the total force, including contractors?**
 - a. Will the tasks to be completed by the military of the future be so different as to require a dramatically different personnel management system than today's, or are the changes less dramatic and can be accomplished by modifications to the current system?
 - b. What degree of interchangeability between military, civilian and contractor is desirable between the AC and RC?
 - c. To what extent should we develop programs to contract for surge or unique capabilities?
- 2. What are the fundamental expectations of a 21st century workforce (compensation/entitlements/education/development/quality of life)?**
- 3. How can DoD respond to the increasing representation of minorities in the American workforce/population?**
 - a. How will the increasing number of minorities in America affect the DoD workforce in the near, mid and longer term, and how does the personnel system need to adapt to it?
 - b. How do we increase the number of minorities and women in the Officer Corps?
 - c. How do we increase the number of minorities and women in the Reserve Component?
- 4. What fundamentals of personnel management are key as we shape the force in the near, mid, and long term?**
 - a. How do we plan to recruit people?**
 1. What will the quality and composition of the future youth population be?
 2. What enlistment incentives are appropriate for 21st century youth?
 3. How will increasing college attendance influence recruitment and retention?
 4. As number of military veteran decrease, how do we ensure our targeted recruiting population and their influencers understand and appreciate DoD's mission and its importance to the nation?
 5. What qualities should we seek in potential recruits?

QUESTIONS TO BE ADDRESSED BY THE HR STRATEGIC PLAN

- b. How do we plan to train/develop people?
 - 1. How do we develop a system that facilitates cross-functional broadening for leadership development and succession planning needs?
 - 2. How should military officer force management change to better balance breadth of experience (generalization) with depth of experience (specialization)? Should we "slow down" assignments to ensure more time-on-station?
- c. How do we ensure accessions and training objectives (short and long-term) are integrated?

5. How can we best sustain the force?

- a. How should we address different requirements for different skills?
- b. What should the military grade structure look like for the future force? How does this differ between the Services?
- c. What flexible force shaping tools and authorities are needed (vesting, career length, movement between active/guard/reserve and civilian components etc.)?
- d. How should we compensate military members?
- e. How should we partner with Industry and other private sector agencies?
- h. How do proposed organizational changes affect personnel development strategies (standing JTF, longer job tenure, etc.)?
- i. What is needed to assure effective attrition management?
- j. How can we better manage members who fulfill more than one role at a time (the civilian employee who is also a reservist, or the reservist that is on a limited duration extended active duty tour)?

6. How can we better link human resources requirements with operational requirements?

Mission-Military Personnel Component of the HR Strategic Plan:

- To provide Human Resource policies, programs, and legislation that ensure the right number of military personnel have the requisite skills and abilities to effectively and efficiently execute assigned missions.

What do we want the military personnel system to look like when we are done?

- A synergistic set of legislation, policies, funding and information technology that fully supports DoD's ability to accomplish its mission. The system will be sufficiently flexible to allow the Services to manage the current force and re-shape the future force quickly as key variables influencing the force change (i.e., economy, national security strategy, national military strategy, labor market, etc.).

What do we want the military personnel system to be able to accomplish when we are done?

- Be customer focused. Move from a transaction-based system to customer advice and strategic partnering.
- Assess the right number of individuals who are intellectually, physically, emotionally, ethically, and morally capable of carrying out the DoD mission.
- Maximize and maintain cultural diversity.
- Retain the right number and the best qualified people in the career force.
- Enhance the readiness of the force for peacetime, contingency, crisis and war fighting.
- Proactively manage DoD's human capital -- Provide an environment free of arbitrary discrimination and harassment that supports both tailored career patterns that will enhance DoD's ability to accomplish its mission and support each member's achievement of personal and professional goals.
- Provide appropriate education, training and development opportunities to enhance technical competence, professional and personal skills, and to foster a culture of continuous learning.
- Provide a flexible, robust compensation and benefits package that complements each member's unique contribution to the mission (to include pay, allowances, healthcare, family support, vesting, retirement options/timing, employer support, etc.) and is competitive with the private sector.
- Be able to anticipate changes in the future that will impact the military personnel system and establish policies and programs to address these changes in a proactive rather than reactive manner consistent with our National Security requirements and meets the Military Services needs.
- Support smooth and complementary two-way process for transition of members between the active, guard, reserve, and civilian components, and return.
- Provide a mechanism for re-assessing the military personnel strategy, measuring its effectiveness through an established metric and adjusting it based on effectiveness and/or changes in the environment (i.e., political, economic, operational, etc.).

APPENDIX D
CHANGE 1 SYNOPSIS
AND
UPDATED LOOS

Military Personnel Human Resources Strategic Plan CHANGE 1

Summary of Changes:

The Human Resource Strategic Plan is designed to remain dynamic through its lifespan. Because of the plan's flexibility, changes are ongoing and updates will be published periodically. The following addresses updates primarily focused on the plan's five Lines of Operation (LOOs). An updated matrix is attached. A minor format change on the matrix combines the "current status" column with the "remarks on status" column. Because the current status constantly changes, the attached matrix provides only a snapshot of the status of tasks. Changes to the LOOs are summarized below:

Line of Operation 1: Increase willingness of American public to recommend military service to our youth. (Page 6)

- Overall objectives for LOO 1 remain the same.
- LOO 1.1 – *Measures of effectiveness*: Increase adult awareness of JRAP advertising by 5 percent. Increase adult likelihood to recommend military service by 5 percent. Increase number of parents who are somewhat/very positive towards encouraging the military as an option for their kids from 26 percent (FY01) to 33 percent. Increase total monthly JRAP website visits by 50 percent; increase annual recruit leads from website by 40 percent. Measures of effectiveness are based upon JRAP FY03 \$41.6M funding level. Implementation date: On hold.
- LOO 1.2 – *Measures of effectiveness*: Increase DoD workforce likelihood to recommend military service by 5 percent based upon JRAP FY03 \$41.6M funding level. Implementation date: On hold.
- LOO 1.3 – No Change

On personnel issues in general...

SECDEF Comments

- “Without the ability to attract and retain the best men and women, the United States Armed Forces will not be able to do their job.” ²
- “...(on) the military side, we’ve got a great many rules and requirements that don’t allow you to have the flexibility that you need.” ⁶
- “...how you feel about what you’re doing. Do you feel that your service is recognized and valued and that your relationships among your peers and with your superiors is what it ought to be? That you have opportunities for promotion and opportunities to make a contribution.” ⁷
- “The force has changed. We have a married force in large measure today, as opposed to a single force. We have a force that’s living in a very different circumstance, as our country is, than it was previously.” ³

USD P&R Comments

- “Critics of current military personnel practices would say we’ve driven the ‘up or out’ principle, both in the officer and enlisted force, a little bit too far.” ¹⁴
- “...the challenge is to keep the best of both worlds – the incentives from ‘up or out’ that prevent stagnation and ‘hangers-on’ and the incentives that would come from letting a person serve longer in a job if they’ve found their niche, are good at it and want to stay in it.” ¹⁴
- “...have we got the right model for the 21st century and for some of the kinds of skills that we want?” ¹⁴

Dr Chu’s writings prior to becoming P&R

- “The success of military personnel management over the last generation offers four potential explanations for success and lessons to learn from this experience.
 - First, in each area a clear, measurable set of objectives was set.... The leadership received regular reports on success in meeting these objectives – or lack thereof – and took action accordingly.
 - Second, military personnel outcomes were seen as the product of a system, and attention was focused on management of the system.
 - Third, quantitative analysis was employed....policymakers were focused on outcomes, not inputs....
 - Fourth, policymakers came to understand that incentives...rather than “rules and regulations” would be the main instruments to achieve the outcomes they desired.” ¹³
- “Structure personnel policies consistent with long-run demographic changes.” ¹³

Line of Operation 2: Recruit the Right Number and Quality (Page 6)

- Overall objectives for LOO 2 remain the same.
- LOO 2.1A/B – *New OPR*: MAJ Kanellis
- LOO 2.2A/B – *New OPR*: MAJ Kanellis
- LOO 2.3A/B – No Change
- LOO 2.4A – *Added Critical Milestone*: Sept 02: Complete review of Services implementation plans.
- LOO 2.4B – *New status*: Efforts to enhance DEOMI and its programs are continuing.
- LOO 2.5A – *New OPR*: MAJ Kanellis; *New status*: Working group established to develop goals.
- LOO 2.5B – *New OPR*: MAJ Kanellis; *Critical Milestones*: Dates are “to be determined” until funds are available.
- LOO 2.5C – *New status*: Funds have been identified and contract awarded to complete study. Current study will develop pilot tests.

Line of Operation 3: Develop, Sustain, and Retain the Force (Pages 6-7)

- Overall objectives have not changed.
- LOO 3.1A – *New status*: Funds identified and awaiting contractor Vice President approval.
- LOO 3.1B – *New status*: Final report completed. Summarized Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation (QRMC) proposals. Study on track
- LOO 3.1C – OPR: COL Knighton. *Critical Milestones*: *New dates have been applied. Aug 02 – Define manpower percentage calculation and get Service buy-in on the definition; Sep 02 Services provide agreed upon manning data and average endstrength data to serve as a base line; Nov 02 – Services report estimate of end fiscal year end strength. Dec 02: Final Report to Services for Coordination.*
- LOO 3.1D – OPR: COL Knighton. *Critical Milestones*: Dates are “to be determined” until funding is allocated.

- LOO 3.1E – OPR: COL Knighton. *Critical Milestones*: Dates are “to be determined” until funding is allocated.
- LOO 3.2A – *New Critical Milestones*: July 02 - Report due to Congress (delayed from Mar 02); July 02 – Determine data reliability; Aug 02 – Identify opportunities for improvement. *New status*: Staffing report. Developed FY04 ULB proposals.
- LOO 3.2B – *Task was divided into two separate tasks and studies*.
- LOO 3.2B(1) – *Action*: Identify opportunities to improve retention environment - Sabbaticals. OPR: COL Knighton. *Implementation*: Sep 02. *Critical Milestones*: March 02 – Award contract; Apr-Jul 02 – Monitor study progress; Aug 02 – Review draft report; Sep 02 – Receive final report. *Status*: Monitoring progress of Sabbatical study. On track. *Measure of Effectiveness*: Draft implementation guidance for sabbatical-type program as appropriate so the Services can implement as they see fit.
- LOO 3.2B(2) – *Action*: Identify other opportunities to improve retention environment. *Implementation*: To be determined. *Critical Milestones*: Identify funds; award contract; monitor contract progress. *Status*: Unfunded priority. *Measure of Effectiveness*: Implementation guidance appropriate for Services’ needs in improving retention.
- LOO 3.2C – OPR: Major Stawick. *Implementation*: Dec 03. *New status*: Three proposals in FY03 Omnibus; Four proposals in the FY04 ULB; DoD Policy in review. *Measures of Effectiveness*: Improved incentives and benefits for overseas service. Increased number of volunteers for hard-to-fill overseas locations.
- LOO 3.2D – New Action. OPR: COL Knighton. Contract. *Implementation Date*: TBD. *Critical Milestones*: Dates TBD to identify funds; award contract; monitor contract progress; *Current Status*: Unfunded priority. *Measure of Effectiveness*: Improved timeliness and quality of data gathered during exit interviews. Increased effectiveness of exit interviews.
- LOO 3.3 – OPR: LCDR Roberson. *Added Critical Milestones*: May 02 – Follow-up survey; May 02 – Brief on DoDD scope; Jun 02 – Services response to follow-up survey. *Measure of Effectiveness*: Improved foreign language proficiency and retention of linguists; Improved foreign language proficiency in operational forces.
- LOO 3.4 – *Added Action*: Conduct “up or stay” study. *New Status*: Funds identified and contract awarded. Phase I: On track for a Dec 02 interim report on GO/FO Careers. Funds allocated for “up or stay” study.
- LOO 3.5A – OPR: LTC Hall. *New Action*: Also evaluate merit of policy whereby general/flag officer deputy or vice would subsequently be selected to the principal

position. *Implementation*: Contract, to be determined. In-house, Jun 02. *In-house Critical Milestones*: Jun 02 – Memo to M&RAs on policies and practices for G/FO; Oct 02 – Review military department reports. *Critical Milestones*: Dates “to be determined” until funding is identified. *Status*: Memo to MRAs June 02. *Measures of Effectiveness*: Understand military Service G/FO management philosophy, policies, and practices. Pool of G/FOs with appropriate skill sets, in sufficient numbers, is available to serve in senior O-9/10 joint and Service Chief billets.

- LOO 3.5B – *New Action*: Conduct study to determine General Flag officer requirements IAW provisions in FY 02 NDAA. *OPR*: LTC Hall. *Implementation*: Oct 2004. *Critical Milestones*: Dates TBD: develop SOW; award contract; monitor progress; review draft report; receive final report. *Current Status*: DUSD(PI) seeking to secure funding. *Measure of Effectiveness*: Report provides sufficient information that satisfies congressional members.
- LOO 3.5C – *New Action*: Develop legislative and policy changes to place Service Chiefs and Combatant Commanders under the same tenure as the Chairman. *OPR*: LTC Hall. *Implementation*: October 2004. *Critical Milestones*: draft legislative proposals and policy; get Services input on legislative and policy proposals; submit proposals to ULB for FY04 slate; track proposals through legislative process. *Current Status*: Priority #1. *Measure of Effectiveness*: NDAA FY04 legislation that gives Service Chiefs and Combatant Commander the same tenure as the Chairman.
- LOO 3.6 – *OPR*: COL Knighton. *Critical Milestones*: Dates are “to be determined” until funding is allocated.
- LOO 3.7 – *OPR*: COL Knighton. *Critical Milestones*: *Dates are “to be determined” until funding is allocated.*
- LOO 3.8 – This task has been suspended.
- LOO 3.9A – *Critical Milestones*: Dates are “to be determined” until funding is allocated. *Added Measure of Effectiveness*: Evaluate concerns and recommendations. Meet established timelines.
- LOO 3.10A – This task has been suspended.
- LOO 3.11 – *New Action*: Develop alternatives for evaluation as part of the FY 2005-2009 DoD Program Review to gradually move officer Intermediate and Senior Service Schools from one year resident to shorter periods of residency. *OPR*: COL Knighton. *Implementation*: Oct 2009. *Critical Milestones*: Dates TBD; develop project description; award contract; monthly IPRs; recommend actions to shorten ISS/SSS. *Measure of Effectiveness*: Officer Intermediate and Senior Service Schools are conducted with minimum residency on a TDY status, utilizing weekend seminars and leveraging distance-learning technologies to facilitate learning.

Line of Operation 4: Transition Members from Active Status (Page 7)

- LOO 4.1A – *New status*: Funds identified and statement of work completed. Awaiting contract agreement.
- LOO 4.1B – *OPR*: COL Knighton. *Critical Milestones*: Dates are “to be determined” until funds have been allocated.
- LOO 4.1C – *OPR*: COL Knighton. *Critical Milestones*: Dates are “to be determined” until funds have been allocated.

Line of Operation 5: Sustain the Process and Maintain its Viability (Page 8)

- LOO 5.1 – *OPR*: Lt Col Jackson. *Critical Milestone*: Mar 03 – Establish Defense Human Resources Board.
- LOO 5.2A – *Critical Milestones*: Dates are “to be determined” until funds have been allocated.
- LOO 5.2B – This task has been suspended.
- LOO 5.2C – *OPR*: Mr. Carr/COL Knighton. *Current Status*: Working initiatives and policy guidance for decreased PCS moves, increased time on station and longer career lengths.

Line of Operation #1		OPR	Contract or In House	Implementation Date	Critical Milestones	Current Status
Increase willingness of American public to recommend military service to our youth						
1	Increase willingness of parents, other adult influencers and opinion makers outside the Armed Forces to recommend military service to American youth.	Maj Schwenn	Contract	Awaiting Funding	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Obtain budget to implement. 2. Develop advertising concept for specific markets. 3. Gain leadership approval. 4. Execute communications campaign. 5. Measure effectiveness of campaign. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. FY02 budget eliminated. 2. FY03 Budget threatened (appeal). 3. Measures of effectiveness revised.
2	Increase willingness of members of the DoD workforce to recommend military service to youth.	Maj Schwenn	Contract	Awaiting Funding	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Obtain budget to implement. 2. Develop advertising concept. 3. Gain leadership approval. 4. Execute communications campaign. 5. Measure effectiveness. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. FY02 budget eliminated. 2. FY03 budget threatened (appeal) 3. MOEs revised. 4. Developing/ conducting workshops to disseminate results within DoD.

3	Increase employer awareness of the importance of supporting Reserve members	Mr. Krimmer 693-7490	In House	TBD	1. Obtain increased funding IAW PBD. 2. Award personnel services contract to support Field Representative Management of Committees. 3. Synchronize Public Affairs mission with committee activities and goals. 4. Increase operation budget of committees upon receipt of PFD funding. 5. Institutionalize ESGR goals for ESGR committees. 6. Establish reporting requirements for committees to follow. 7. Measure committee effectiveness against established goals. 8. Adjust programs) as required.	1. Employer data base increased in size. 2. Developing strategic plan to increase employer contacts. 3. Enhancing Ombudsman data base. Contacted RA office to get current update. (29May02)

Line of Operation #2		OPR	Contract/ In House	Implementation Date	Critical Milestones	Current Status
Recruit the Right Number and Quality						
1	Achieve qualitative and quantitative goals for Active, Guard, and Reserve components for enlisted requirements.					
A	Access enlisted personnel possessing the right level of education and aptitude.	Capt Rutherford Maj Kanellis	In House	Immediate	Jul 02: Quarterly status review Dec 02: Achieve quality metrics at end of fiscal year	Need Air National Guard detailed data (getting total achieved)
B	Access the right number of enlisted personnel in the required skills to meet readiness requirements.	Capt Rutherford Maj Kanellis	In House	Immediate	Apr 02: Quarterly status review Jul 02: Quarterly status review Oct 02: Achieve quality metrics at end of fiscal year	Need Air National Guard detailed data (getting total achieved)
2	Achieve qualitative and quantitative goals for Active officer requirements.					
A	Meet the Service officer accession targets by component and required skill areas annually.	Maj Leong	In House	Immediate	Mar 02 - Aug 02: Track current year Service projections Sep 02: Meet Annual Goal	On track
B	Ensure the Service OCS/OTS have workable surge plans to provide a short-term increase in production as required to offset shortfalls in other commissioning programs or provide short notice increases in commissioned officers due to wartime or other increased mission requirements.	Maj Leong	In House	Jan-03	Apr 02: Task Services to create/provide plans Jun 02: Receive current plans from the Services Dec 02: Receive updated plans from the Services. Collect and evaluate plans Jan 03: Continue to monitor surge capabilities	On track
3	Promote effective and efficient selection and assignment testing procedures to maximize potential of all enlisted Service members.					

A	Validate Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB)	Dr. Arabian	Both	Start Jun 2003 (Tasks will require OSD \$'s)	a. Obtain Joint-Service agreement to participate. b. Identify specialties and criterion data for each. c. Find POCs for gathering criterion data. d. Data analysis. e. Initiate process for continuing validation. f. Convene expert panel to review ASVAB content.	1. Services agree on need for validation. 2. Service reps met to review ASVAB research. 3. Scope depends on funding.
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	Line of Operation #2 Recruiting the Right Number and Quality.	OPR	Contract/ In House	Implementation	Critical Milestones	Current Status
B	Obtain resources to modernize Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery testing.	Dr. Arabian	Both	1. Jan 2003 2. Sep 2004	1 a. Complete feasibility study. b. Identify suitable sites. c. Fund & procure computers. 2 a. Complete prototype. b. Pilot tests in high schools. c. Develop verification test. (Security/Identity System) d. Fund and procure servers for 24/7 operations.	1. Feasibility study nearly completed. 2. Programming for CAT-ASVAB on internet in progress. 3. Funding will drive implementation..
4	Aggressively Pursue workforce w/diverse race, ethnic, gender and socioeconomic backgrounds					
A	Review findings of Career Progression Study	Col Johnson/ Mr. Love 697-6381	In House	December 2002	Mar 02: Disseminate the revised Joint Study Equal Opportunity Task Force (JSEOTF) final action plan to the Services for implementation. Jul 02: Annually resource contracted analytical MEOA support. Aug 02: Annually assess JSEOTF action plan progress concurrent with annual MEOA report assessments. Aug 02: Provide Services annual analysis/feedback on MEOA. Sept 02: Complete review of Services implementation plans. Dec 02: Provide Services biannual feedback on gender/climate surveys.	1. Action Plan in coordination with OGC 2. Staffing on the JSEOTF final action plan/ milestones revised.

B	Ensure a DEOMI on the cutting edge	Col Johnson/ Mr. Love	In House	October 2003	Jul 02: Provide guidance to Services on management of EO executive Seminars. Oct 02: Monitor implementation of PBD 005. Oct 02: Next curriculum review with ongoing annual review milestones. Initiate actions to conduct DoD efficiency review of DEOMI. Oct 03: Monitor completion of Air Force funded MILCON project.	1. Efforts to enhance DEOMI and its programs are continuing. 2. Revised critical milestones to reflect latest developments.
	Line of Operation #2 Recruiting the Right Number and Quality	OPR	Contract or In House	Implementation Date	Critical Milestones	Current Status
5	Establish transparent migration opportunities between the Active and Reserve component, as well as other manpower resources.					
A	Develop policies and programs to facilitate a seamless transfer from active duty into the Selected Reserve to meet Service needs and individual desires.	MAJ Kanellis	In House	December 2003	Apr 02: Assemble Study Group(met) May 02 - Apr 03: Develop Policy and Procedures and Seek Consensus Among Participants Oct 03: Develop Transfer Goal and Seek Consensus Among Participants Dec 03: OUSD P&R Approval on recommended Policies, Procedures, and Transfer Goal.	Working group met and will determine how to establish goals.

B	Conduct a study to develop policies and programs to facilitate a seamless transfer from the reserve components to active duty to meet critical Service readiness needs.	MAJ Kanellis	Contract	March 2003	TBD 02: Identify Funding Source TBD 02: Award Contract TBD 03: Monthly Progress Reports TBD 03: Receive Draft Report TBD 03: Receive Final Report	Working to identify funds and award a contract to complete the study.
C	Develop and execute pilot tests for lateral entry based on civilian skills	Dr. Arabian	Contract	March 2003	March 02: Identify Funding Source May 02: Award Contract Jun 02 - Jan 03: Quarterly Progress Reports Feb 03: Receive Draft Report on Potential Areas for Implementation Mar 03: Receive Final Report on Potential Areas for Implementation Apr 03: Advise Contractor to Proceed with Implementation Guidance and Pilot Program May 03 - Jan 04: Monthly Progress Reports Feb 04: Receive First Draft of Pilot Program Results Mar 04: Receive Final Report on Pilot Program	1. Funds identified and contract awarded to complete study.(RAND) 2. Current study will only develop pilot tests.